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NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

WINNING WITH WORDS:

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

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Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
<p>Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.</p>					
1. REPORT DATE 2002	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2002 to 00-00-2002			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Winning with Words: Strategic Communications and the War on Terrorism			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE unclassified unclassified unclassified			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 36	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

WINNING WITH WORDS:
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

“I could argue that you could preempt a war by getting the right information—accurate information—to the right people in a timely fashion. You may not, but if you don’t try you sure won’t.”

General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Osama bin Laden used terror to shock and demoralize the American public, to discredit American’s strength, and to reduce support for American involvement abroad—and it worked. Part of his success can be attributed to his strategic use of communications. The wrenching visuals of commercial airliners-turned-missiles slamming into the World Trade Center, followed by his pre-recorded videos, and the media coverage of anti-American demonstrations, all served to advance bin Laden’s messages. These well-timed, well-placed, and extremely effective messages were designed to exploit our open and ubiquitous news media, with non-stop coverage amplifying the destruction, and increasing the fear.

“For someone who scorned modernity and globalization, and who took refuge in an Islamic state that banned television, bin Laden proved remarkably adept at public diplomacy... He turned to al Jazeera to reach the two audiences that were essential to his plans—the Western news media and the Arab masses,”² suggests David Hoffman, president of Internews Network, a nongovernmental media organization.

The United States, on the other hand, continues to struggle with the strategic communication mission, uncertain how to approach it, who to put in charge of it, and even what

to call it. Whether it is referred to as ‘public diplomacy,’ ‘information operations,’ or the ‘battle for hearts and minds,’ the results are the same: we are losing. Being out-communicated by a guy in a cave goes beyond humiliating—it is dangerous. Unless we can effectively use the instrument of power known as ‘Information,’ we risk losing credibility and public support around the world. Without these, we cannot win a global war on terrorism.

This paper will explore the process of incorporating all of our agencies’ tools and talents into one focused, synergistic approach, resulting in an effective communications strategy to win the war on terrorism.

Information as an Instrument of Power: The world respects the military supremacy of the United States; yet the attack of September 11 showed that military strength alone is not an effective answer to national defense, especially when it comes to defeating terrorism. Our response to the war on terrorism must incorporate all instruments of national power: diplomacy, economy, military, and information. In theory, the NSC is designed to incorporate the best ideas from all elements of national power for a coordinated recommendation to assist the administration in the decision-making process. In practice, however, ideas regarding the nation’s informational power are noticeably absent from the process. No one in the NSC owns the ‘information dissemination’ portfolio. Without visibility and coordination at this level, the power of information is not fully integrated into any national security planning, and weakens our strategy for the war against terrorism.

ENDS: The Objectives of a Communication Strategy

Incorporating all of our nation’s communications tools and talents into one clear and focused message is the real purpose of a communications strategy. It must be broader in scope

than the State Department's public diplomacy, aimed strictly at international audiences. It calls for more than DOD "sending in the Marines" with their affinity for good press. It is more than a slick, professional ad campaign, or a speech from the White House. More than the sum of these parts, a communications strategy must be coordinated across all government agency lines, and, wherever appropriate, it should include expertise from the private sector.

Clear message of U.S. Intent: What exactly is a communications strategy? It is a coordinated plan for disseminating accurate information about the United States, designed to communicate our nation's goals and intentions clearly, truthfully, and deliberately to audiences around the world and at home.

In its simplest form, a communications strategy will allow us to tell our story, get the facts straight, and correct misinformation. In a broader sense, an effective communications strategy is an integral and necessary part of the war on terrorism. A communications strategy is a pragmatic requirement for sustaining support for our efforts as the war on terrorism continues. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Task Force on America's Response to Terrorism: "We must create an understanding in the Muslim world of our cause and our actions that will give their leaders more flexibility to support the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks."³

Informed Decisions: One key objective of a communication strategy is to provide truthful and timely information in order to overcome the information deficit, or in some cases, to counteract the anti-American rhetoric prompted from various regimes around the world. Providing accurate information makes it possible for our allies and adversaries alike to make informed decisions about the United States. Clarity of our message can reduce the potential for the calculus of error on the receiver's end.

Richard Holbrooke, U.S. permanent representative to United Nations during the Clinton administration, and now with the Council on Foreign Relations, described the objective in these terms: "...defining what this war is really about in the minds of the one billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance...The battle of ideas therefore is as important as any other aspect of the struggle we are now engaged in. It must be won."⁴

The United States' response to the attacks of September 11 was slow and confusing. Our initial messages emphasized a total disbelief that anyone would want to harm us. Despite our most sophisticated military might and economic strength, the United States struggled with the very idea of needing to respond to a communications strategy directed against us.

"The United States lost the public relations war in the Muslim world a long time ago," according to Osama Siblani, publisher of the *Arab American News* in Dearborn. "They could have the prophet Muhammad doing public relations and it wouldn't help."⁵

Remarkably, the United States -- the world's superpower, home of Hollywood, multiple 24-hour news channels, and the "dot com" revolution -- came up empty-handed in the strategic communications department. "Why do they hate us?" became a common headline. Even the President was puzzled: "I'm amazed there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I just can't believe it because I know how good we are. And we've got to do a better job of making our case."⁶ A negative world opinion of the United States came as a shock to the home front, and serves to emphasize that even the world's communication 'Mecca' needs a coherent, well-developed, communications strategy to help others understand what the United States is really all about.

Convince the Fence-Setters: It is hard to imagine that everyone in the world hates us. In fact, everyone does not hate us. Most just do not understand us. Another objective then is a

communications strategy that will inform the populations of the world, and help them make up their minds about the United States' intent. Robert Killebrew, a consultant with U.S. Commission on National Security, expressed the importance of communicating with the mass public overseas: "There are the Fence-setters—those who don't hate us yet, but might over time. This group is often less sophisticated, and has less access to information. As a result, we need to provide them with information on our government's policy, but also more open ended, general, people-to-people type information."⁷

Gain/Maintain Public Support: Perhaps the strongest argument for a communications strategy is the need for public support, both domestically, and abroad. Michael Howard, Professor of History of War at Oxford suggests that this support is the key to destroying terrorism: "It is well known that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Terrorists can be successfully destroyed only if public opinion, both at home and abroad, supports the authorities in regarding them as criminals rather than heroes."⁸ Strategic communications can be used to both build support for the United States, and take it from the enemy. By providing contextually accurate and timely coverage of terrorists' deadly actions, one can effectively take away the terrorists' moral 'high ground,' and make them seek public support through other means.

Garnering U.S. support from the international community will be most difficult. With globalization, world opinion has become more complicated, for it is not just a matter of dealing government-to-government; now the support of the 'street' matters. Robert Wright recently noted, "Fifty years ago...so long as leaders abroad either liked us or feared us, we were safe. But, with massively lethal force increasingly available to nongovernmental groups, world opinion more broadly matters. Some small fraction of today's brooding, America-hating masses

will become tomorrow's terrorists. So shrinking these masses, however difficult, is one way to fight terrorism.”⁹

Public support here at home also requires our attention. According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age: “There are few recent examples of success in foreign policy where the United States acted alone—and none where the United States government acted successfully without the support of the American public.”¹⁰

The terrorist attacks of September 11 occurred on American soil, against innocent civilians, so U.S. public support was initially strong and resolute. Yet as one senior government official noted, “We cannot assume domestic support forever. The U.S. Government’s ‘Job Number One’ has to be U.S. support, with coalition support being a close second.”¹¹

But this war promises to be protracted, different than other wars, and often difficult to see. Without a concerted effort to maintain it, domestic support for the war on terrorism will fade, like the small American flags waving from car antennas. How will we maintain public support when the mental images of September 11 fade—or were never there? What will sustain the soldiers battling terrorism who were not yet born when the towers of the World Trade Center fell? We must be able to communicate our policy objectives, both at home and abroad, over the long haul. A communications strategy is vital to gaining—and maintaining—public support.

It Is Not About Hearts and Minds, Virginia: Irrespective of the number of newspaper headlines to the contrary, a communications strategy for the war on terrorism does not include ‘winning hearts and minds.’ A major objective of strategic communications is informed decisions on the part of our audiences overseas—so they can either help us in our fight against terrorism, acquiesce to the actions we are about to take, or, if nothing more, get the hell out of

our way. The more idealistic goal of winning hearts and minds is lofty, indeed noble, but it is overreach.

Clearly and consistently communicating our political objectives serves strategic purpose. A number of recent messages from U.S. officials focusing on Iraqi leadership serve to illustrate this point. Saddam may not know exactly when or how, but he has no reason to doubt U.S. resolve to bring about a regime change in Iraq. Through numerous speeches and public opportunities to reinforce this point, President Bush has not once attempted to win over the people of Iraq. He has, however, communicated his message of intent very clearly, and left the details up to the listener's imagination.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld released a statement three weeks after the start of military operations in Afghanistan that argued, in part: "In the end, war is not about statistics, deadlines, short attention spans, or 24-hour news cycles. It is about will—the projection of will, the clear, unambiguous determination of the President and the American people to see this through to certain victory. In other American wars, enemy commanders have come to doubt the wisdom of taking on the strength and power of this nation and the resolve of her people."¹² Rumsfeld's statement did not address hearts, or minds.

Yet as a nation, we are somehow drawn to the idea of winning hearts and minds. The issue of communicating strategically is made all the more complicated by our own cultural predisposition: we want to be liked. "Hearts and minds" is a type of shorthand for our desire to be liked. In fact, the phrase, much like "public diplomacy," has become a euphemism with too many definitions. Some people refer to military psychological operations as "hearts and minds." Others say it when they really mean community outreach or humanitarian assistance programs. Still others think of propaganda, or brainwashing. Often, people say "hearts and minds" when

they really mean using any instrument of national power short of military operations. Especially in the war on terrorism, when clarity of message is paramount, any term that holds so many different meanings should be avoided. We run the risk of confusing ourselves about our strategic purpose – and if we are confused, one can only imagine what “hearts and minds” sounds like overseas. No wonder they hate us—or at least misunderstand us.

WAYS: Requirements of an effective Communication Strategy

Defining the requirements of a communications strategy for the war on terrorism requires a look at what it is NOT. It is not an opportunity to ‘spin’ a story or intentionally lead an audience to believe something that is not accurate.

Communicating the Truth: Edward R. Murrow, famous World War II broadcast journalist and former director of United States Information Agency once said, “To be persuasive, we must be believable. To be believable, we must be credible. To be credible, we must be truthful.”

Above all else, a communications strategy for the war on terrorism must be about open, public, and truthful communications—for it is a generation of lies that we are fighting. Entire populations do not have access to the truth; they have no alternative to the hatred churned out by those who wish us ill. As a result, they believe incredulous stories about thousands of Jews being warned not to show up for work at the World Trade Center; and a French author can sell a book about the Pentagon staging the attacks of September 11.¹³ Truth is the best defense against such lies.

Strategically, truthful communications support our policies, and undercut those of our enemies. Far too much attention has already been given to the demise of Department of Defense’s Office of Strategic Influence, and its alleged plans to mislead, or deceive the public in

the name of supporting the policies of the United States. Had this office been allowed to operate as it was presented in the press, the results would have only added to the suspicion and confusion about U.S. intentions in the war on terrorism.

Truth, and our constitutionally protected free press that validates it, give this nation a strategic advantage. “The United States has a tremendous advantage over practically any of our enemies, and that is the truth,” according to Robert Killebrew. “If the government says something, and the press verify it, then you have a very, very powerful communications message. This is an important point that gets more important as the world gets more complex.”¹⁴ According to John McWethy, ABC News, “The truth is just the best defense – then no apologies are necessary.”¹⁵

Perhaps the most important lesson from the war in Vietnam is that truthful communication is crucial to obtaining and sustaining public support. Popular support for the war in Vietnam remained extremely high until 1969, despite the growing number of casualties and the protracted nature of the war. Support dropped off as a result of the discovery that information presented by the U.S. government had been intentionally misleading, in an attempt to paint a more positive picture than facts on the ground could support. “Reporters in Vietnam were allowed widespread travel and access to combat, but found their firsthand observations often at odds with the optimistic views advanced by military briefers at the ‘Five O’clock Follies’ in Saigon,” stated John Hughes, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.¹⁶ Once the public’s trust had been violated, and the government’s credibility lost, no legitimate argument was sufficient to rebuild public support.

This war against terrorism, like that war against communism, promises to be long, protracted, and complex. Sustaining public support over time will require a clear communication

strategy, grounded in the truth. “Bad things won’t turn American people – but we will lose their support if we aren’t candid,” according to Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.¹⁷ We cannot compromise this most basic tenet of our nation’s values. If we do, no amount of strategic communicating will help us deliver a message that reflects our genuine objectives for the war on terrorism.

The consequences of communicating anything other than truth are simply too severe. It destroys our nation’s credibility, and negates any further attempts to communicate openly. It strengthens the enemy, and ironically reinforces the believability of his lies. But perhaps most importantly, it erodes public support, as it did during Vietnam.

WAYS: Communicating Effectively is Hard!

It is one thing to argue in favor of an effective, integrated, over-arching communications strategy for the war on terrorism; it is another thing entirely to create one. And as countless recent news articles have attested, it is not so easy. Far from just saying nice things about the United States, the concept of communicating strategically is a complex one. Culturally, the United States approaches information quite differently than other countries, complicating the issue all the more. Additionally, to be effective, we have to communicate with many different audiences—enemies, friends, coalition partners, disinterested masses, and the home front. While there is some common ground, different government agencies have different missions, so they tend to focus on different audiences, providing different messages, over different channels. And finally, success lies in both saying and doing. Actions of U.S. policy will speak louder than any words in a communications strategy. The two have to be mutually supportive, based on an

understanding that any policy missteps will drown out the very best messages of a communications strategy.

Cultural Differences: Americans enjoy a freedom of the press and open communications that is beyond conceptualization in some places abroad. Our extremely transparent environment makes it hard to appreciate how information is received by audiences overseas. According to Ralph Peters: “It is difficult to bring the vital importance of informational freedom home to Americans simply because it is taken for granted.”¹⁸

In fact, while American media complain about the lack of information available on the war on terrorism, other countries’ press agencies are absolutely amazed by the abundance and accuracy of America’s news coverage. According to Umit Enginsoy, Washington Bureau Chief for Turkey’s National Television: “Communication in the United States is incomparable. American press provides an article in the newspaper, and you know who said what, and how you know it to be true. This is a reflection of one of the greatest gifts of this country. An article in another paper [overseas] might be very interesting, but there is no way to know if the information is true or not.”¹⁹

This cultural difference in how we approach information can further complicate a communications strategy, especially on topics such as support within the coalition. For Americans, our actions in the war on terrorism, particularly our military response, is a source of pride that we discuss, praise, and critique very publicly. Yet little information is provided about actions or support from other members of the coalition. Many countries do not want their support publicized, for fear of increasing political instability. According to Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, PAO for Central Command: “Other coalition members have no intention of acknowledging their support. While frustrating for Americans, we must be sensitive to the fact

that one size does NOT fit all. If the price of poker is support, with an agreement to respect their decisions on public visibility, then we've got to do it.”²⁰ Based on this intentionally partial media coverage, Americans focus on our own contributions, and tend to think of the war on terrorism in unilateral terms; other countries see this as a reinforcement of their beliefs about American arrogance. These cultural differences in how we approach information must be factored into the overall strategic communications equation.

Perhaps as a result of our nation’s size and power, Americans rarely consider another nation’s point of view. We tend to think everyone thinks as we think, and consequently, when another’s view does not match our own, we are confused. “Americans are truly baffled. After all, this is a country made up of kind people who are industrious and proud of their high ideals and sense of fairness. But as we have seen...these truths are not self-evident,” insists Mouafac Harb, Washington Bureau Chief for *Al Hayat*. “What policymakers are missing is a deeper understanding of what the message sounds like when it lands on the ears of Arabs and Muslims.”²¹

As a democracy, we believe so strongly in freedom of speech, that we have paid little heed to years of extremely negative rhetoric against the United States. Let them say what they want; we are the benevolent superpower. Yet generations have grown up in desperate conditions, hearing only anti-American messages from state-run media. Knowing nothing of the truth about the United States, and looking for someone to blame, they understandably target America. Sticks and stones might break our bones, but words can *really* hurt us.

Tom Gjelten, military correspondent for National Public Radio, suggests an era of anti-Americanism is developing as a result of the United States’ position as the only superpower. “Other nations harbor a resentment of our power, and consider us a hegemon. Their perception

is that the U.S. thinks it does not have to answer to anyone. This creates an ideological backdrop to the problem, building an instinctive distrust of anything the U.S. does. Our tough skin, or ‘don’t be bothered with it’ approach has not helped. We should be engaging them, working all the harder.”²² Breaking through this extreme skepticism will be a daunting task for the United States, but it is one that must be addressed.

Matching Audiences and Messages: While sometimes addressed separately, domestic and international audiences must not be considered in isolation. Today’s technology has removed all information firewalls, so that what was intended to be heard by one audience, is heard by all. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that both domestic and international audiences will interpret the same message in the same way. If we communicate different messages at home and abroad, we run the risk of appearing to be disingenuous with one, or both, audiences. Nothing would more quickly negate any strategic ground gained than a mismatch of what is said abroad and what is said at home.

Admiral Quigley proposes that sometimes a message one audience needs to hear, is inappropriate for another audience. “Many other countries do not like to see news about how good our military is. Some fear us; some are jealous of our capabilities. But the domestic audience is very interested in how our military is doing in Afghanistan and elsewhere.”²³ Sorting out who should hear what is a delicate, complex, but sometimes necessary part of a communications strategy.

In order to be most effective, the message should, to the extent possible, be tailored to fit each audience. Not creating separate messages, but rather delivering the same basic message or theme through various methods will help us to be understood across the spectrum of audiences.

Creating and disseminating these basic themes to be communicated by all agencies across all channels is an important aspect of a communications strategy.

Sometimes messages understood and believed at home are incomprehensible by audiences overseas. President Bush used the term ‘crusade,’ and Americans did not bat an eye. The rest of the world heard his message and cringed. We say we are fighting for freedom, but to those who have never experienced it, ‘freedom’ does not hold the same meaning. Robert Wehling, 40-year employee with Procter & Gamble remarked: “While the message of freedom is essential to all in the U.S. and the Western world, it may not be the optimum message over there. While everyone values freedom, there are some who equate excesses and abuses of freedom with excessive consumption and other negative aspects of Western culture.”²⁴

Messages have only the value the audience gives them. For example, North Korea as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ just did not resonate with most foreign audiences. Michio Hayashi, correspondent with *Yomiuri Shimbun*, emphasized this dissonant message: “U.S. says ‘liberty’ and ‘values;’ they say, ‘what about my next meal?’ You could better communicate if you could better learn what rings the bell or touches their heart—in their language.”²⁵

Mouafac Harb emphasized the importance of understanding the complexity of addressing international audiences: “Know the audience. America likes to think of itself as a complicated place—50 states and 285 million differences of opinion. Now consider the Muslim world—1.2 billion people, living in sixty nations. You cannot expect to win the war of ideas and images here with a strategy of ‘media carpet bombing.’”²⁶

Placemats, Not Tablecloths: To be successful, a communications strategy must take into account these differences in points of reference, and create messages that make sense to the intended audience. During recent testimony before the House International Relations

Committee, Robert Wehling emphasized the need to have people living in the area involved in the development of the message. He used the example of an ad campaign for Tide detergent, in which a large white tablecloth billows forth to illustrate how clean it is after being washed with Tide. However, during their research with local Arab consumers, Proctor and Gamble discovered that the majority of Arabs used placemats on their tables—so a bright clean tablecloth held little value. Research saved Proctor & Gamble both cost and embarrassment; imagine the impact of an advertising slogan such as ‘Dirt can’t hide from intensified Tide’ among Bedouin tribes for whom ‘dirt’ meant ‘camel dung.’²⁷ Picking up on these cultural nuances, and deciphering the information context abroad, is what U.S. foreign service officers at our embassies and consulates abroad are expected to do; enhancing their abilities to do so effectively will be an important part of a U.S. communications strategy.

Without extensive experience in another country, it is hard to imagine how our messages must sound. When asked about our ability to communicate outside of the United States, Michio Hayashi observed: “U.S. messages are good for American Muslims, but not for those outside of the country. You do not know how to speak to people unless you’ve lived there [where they live.] The United States is a world within itself. Don’t assume anyone outside the U.S. understands U.S. freedoms. It is important to get others to speak on America’s behalf.”²⁸

Another cultural complexity involved in strategic communications is the feedback loop, or hearing what the audience is saying back. The best way to measure the effectiveness of a message is to listen to the response. Frankly, Americans do not put a lot of energy into this effort. We listen through our own filters, and judge the response based on our own expectations. Pavel Vanichkin, correspondent with Russia’s *Itar-Tass News Agency* used the world response to the September 11 events to explain this point. The American press paid significant attention to

President Putin's letter of support to the United States. According to Vanichkin, a statement of sympathy from a head of state is expected, but thousands of Russians, many who have barely enough money to feed their families, purchased flowers to leave as a tribute at the U.S. embassy in Moscow.²⁹ That was a tangible sign of support, but we missed the point.

Similarly, the events of September 11 prompted the Japanese Diet to draft legislation to bypass its constitutional prohibition against the Japan Self Defense Forces' involvement in international wars. In record time, four Japanese vessels were deployed in support of the United States in the war on terrorism.³⁰ Both the significance and the speed of this action were lost on most Americans. Some may argue that four ships, more or less, will not make much of a difference in the war on terrorism. Perhaps not, but if we continue to miss the essence of what our coalition partners are trying to communicate to us, we will soon find ourselves alone battling both terrorism and the world's contempt.

Matching Words to Actions: Different cultures, multiple audiences, unclear messages, and misunderstood responses all combine to make communicating strategically a complex matter. Yet even the best communication can be derailed if it is not supported by the foreign policies of the United States. Actions really do speak louder than words. Prime Minister Tony Blair flew across the Atlantic to be present during President Bush's address to the joint session of Congress in September; he backed up his words of support with tangible actions that proved the resolve of our British allies. Any message we communicate, to be believed, must be consistent with our actions. According to Admiral Quigley, we were successful in making this work in Afghanistan. "It was a stroke of genius to drop food and warm clothes at the same time we were dropping bombs. It proved to Muslims everywhere that we wanted to help the good people of

Afghanistan. Today, they continue to see humanitarian operations to include hospitals, mine-clearing operations, NGOs, and schools, and they believe we are making a difference.”³¹

In other areas of the world, however, we have not been as successful in matching our words with our actions. John Esposito, a professor of religion and international affairs at Georgetown University noted, “It is time to also realize that they see more than we see. Anti-Americanism is driven not by the blind hatred or religious zealotry of extremists, but also by a frustration and anger with U.S. policy among the mainstream in the Muslim world.”³² While many U.S. policies are not directly related to the war on terrorism, the impact they have on our international audience is. A successful communications strategy for the war on terrorism must take into account our foreign policy actions, ensuring that what we do does not contradict what we say.

WAYS: Coordinating Effectively is Hard!

Communicating across cultural boundaries, with many audiences, and in the shadow of often-complex U.S. policy, helps demonstrate the need for a coordinated effort at the interagency level. There have been a number of attempts at coordinating a communications strategy within the NSC framework; unfortunately all have met with little success.

NSDD 77: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77, dated January 14, 1983, addressed the “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security.” The NSDD established a Special Planning Group, to be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which would “be responsible for the overall planning, direction, coordination and monitoring of implementation of public diplomacy activities.”³³

NSDD 130: During March 1984, President Reagan signed a second NSDD relating to information as an instrument of U.S. national policy. NSDD 130, “U.S. International

Information Policy,” highlighted a need for sustained commitment to improving the effectiveness and quality of international information. The document cited a lack of adequate resources, and directed a comprehensive review of funding needed for international information activities, with emphasis on more extensive training programs within the various agencies. It approved the formation of the Foreign Opinion Research Advisory Group, to improve research on public opinion, media reaction, and cultural factors.³⁴

PDD 68: President Clinton established Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68, “International Public Information” on April 30, 1999. This PDD was in direct response to the difficulties encountered during military missions in Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia, which demonstrated the need for coordination of U.S. messages among the various agencies, and the importance of clearly articulating and promoting U.S. policies, and counteracting bad press abroad. PDD 68 established an International Public Information (IPI) Core Group, designed to influence foreign audiences in support of U.S. foreign policy, and to counteract enemy propaganda.³⁵ PDD-68 created structure, process and a policy for international public information, but did not survive the change in administration.

Defense Science Board Task Force: Co-sponsored by the Department of Defense and the Department of State, this study focused on Managed Information Dissemination. The final report, dated October 2001, makes a strong argument for a more coherent approach to strategic international information dissemination. “Information is a strategic resource...influence and power go to those who can disseminate credible information in ways that will mobilize publics to support interests, goals, and objectives.”³⁶

The study found that previous International Public Information (IPI) initiatives were limited in scope, short in duration, and normally focused on a specific crisis or region. Members

had other full-time jobs, and suffered from limited time and a steep learning curve. This ad-hoc approach meant that with each new crisis, a committee had to be reconstituted, often with new members and new leadership, to learn again the lessons learned from the last event. The study found that current IPI initiatives are not realizing their objective due to lack of funding, staffing, and high-level interest.³⁷ It also noted a need for improved coordination between military planning and Department of State initiatives, as well as a more effective use of tools outside of the U.S. government, such as the Internet and other commercial efforts. The task force concluded that: “the U.S. Government’s highest priority is to provide an adequate framework to help coordinate strategic international information dissemination.”³⁸

The task force made a number of recommendations for actions to be carried out by the President, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. Perhaps the most significant recommendation was for a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination, designed to strengthen communication with foreign audiences, and to coordinate timely public affairs, public diplomacy, and open military information planning and dissemination activities. The NSPD would establish an NSC Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination, chaired by a person of Under Secretary rank as designated by the Secretary of State, and assisted by a deputy designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.³⁹

The Defense Science Board Task Force drew on the expertise of dozens of professionals across the spectrum of Defense, State, and corporate worlds. Their timing could not have been better, as they devoted serious study throughout the first half of 2001 to the development of a coordinated approach to strategic communications planning, and created a thorough report that

was published shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Great energy and effort went into the study, but as of yet, precious little action has resulted from it.

MEANS: the Interagency ‘Instruments’

Without an overall coordination mechanism, government agencies and private organizations are on their own to create a program for disseminating information about the United States. The resulting communication is often sound, but not necessarily strategic. Each agency, like instruments in an orchestra, has a distinct timbre, and plays the music based on its own interpretation of the mission. Many of the instruments share common definitions – each organization can make similar assumptions about the audience, the speed at which information travels, the channels used to send messages, the need for truth and integrity in the message, and even the desired outcome, but each organization provides unique contributions—melodies—to a communications strategy. These core distinctions, often strengths of the organizations, can get in the way of an organized, overarching approach to a communications strategy.

State Department: The State Department’s efforts at strategic communication are called public diplomacy, and are focused strictly on reaching the international audience – to include the decision makers and the ‘street’ in areas affected by U.S. policy. A series of budget cuts, leadership changes, and recent restructuring of previously United States Information Agency assets under the State’s regional bureaus resulted in a slow start for public diplomacy in the war on terrorism.

In response to the attacks of September 11, the State Department created a Crisis Response Team in the operations center, then formed a Public Diplomacy Task Force and a Political-Military Task Force. These task forces later transitioned to a Coalition Working Group. Bruce

Gregory worked first on the Crisis Response Team, then transitioned to supervising the Coalition Working Group for eight weeks. “The work was complicated in that we have a division of labor between domestic and international public diplomacy, yet technology does not respect those borders.” Gregory indicated that a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) had already been drafted that would establish a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to coordinate the interagency efforts at information dissemination. “The idea behind the PCC is that information is just as important an instrument of power and needs strategic thought and analysis.” While agreeing with the idea of a coordinating mechanism, the interagency continues to debate what agency should take the lead.⁴⁰

According to Neal Walsh, a State Department employee with the overall responsibility for regional bureaus and radio, “Secretary Powell created two good pressures at State: he is a big believer in public diplomacy, and in rebuilding—returning power to the embassies.” This recognition of the importance of public diplomacy by the most senior leadership unleashed all State people to speak out, with very positive results. By mid December, using every speaker and speaking opportunity available, State was responsible for over 100 presentations on Arab media. Overseas, they had conducted 1200 TV and radio interviews, placed 500 opinion pieces in newspapers, resulting in more than 1000 stories published about America, and unknown thousands more available electronically.⁴¹

The State Department created a number of useful communication tools and products in the weeks immediately following September 11. Bill Parker, Director, International Information Programs, and Education and Cultural Affairs, proudly displayed State Department’s “Response to Terrorism” website (<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/>). The site provided timely, reliable information about the tragic events of September 11, to include a dramatic visual

depiction of all the countries that had lost citizens in the attacks. The site also included a number of personal stories and photos that put a face on a loss that was otherwise only represented in numbers. Many of the faces were of Muslims who perished in the World Trade Center.⁴²

Another tool created by State to support strategic communications is the International Public Information website, called IPI Central. An internal information tool, IPI Central is a consolidated source of daily updates and useful information on foreign policy issues. Through the use of these and other very effective websites, created by the State Department and available in multiple languages, country teams around the world can place stories with local media, and are better prepared to tell the American story on any number of foreign policy issues.

Foreign Press Centers: The Department of State operates foreign press centers in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles. These little-known communication tools offer easy access to 2,000 foreign journalists residing in United States. The purpose of the press centers is to promote depth, accuracy, and balance in foreign reporting. They offer facilities to write and produce news, as well as access to government briefings, tours, and other opportunities to gain valuable context to help explain U.S. policy issues.⁴³

Colonel Rick Machamer, DOD Liaison to Washington Foreign Press Center, explained that the 800 foreign correspondents assigned to the Washington, D.C. area have access to government briefings, both those conducted in their workspace—located in the same building as the National Press Club—as well as those that are remotely fed from other areas. The Foreign Press Center helps educate the correspondents on the workings of the U.S. government, and the location allows for immediate response. “Forty-five minutes at the Foreign Press Center reaches the world,” according to Machamer. The foreign media are there, ready to listen, and all interviews or briefing sessions are taped and sent to every embassy for distribution to their local media.⁴⁴

Department of Defense: Just as the State Department’s public diplomacy is focused on international audiences, the Defense Department’s public affairs mission has a strictly domestic focus—the American public. The DOD enjoys an advantage in that the military instrument of power has the most experience with telling its story, especially to the U.S. media. Because military missions are often high profile, dangerous, and involve risk to human lives and costly equipment, the people involved have come to expect media interest. As a result, DOD has gained valuable experience at keeping the American public informed. Unfortunately, other agencies – and the instruments that will likely be used most in the war against terrorism – are less familiar with the task of communicating openly about their mission. Yet DOD finds itself in front of the microphone, even when the story to be told is not theirs.

International Broadcasting Agencies: International broadcasting is an often-overlooked instrument that can readily support strategic communications efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an independent agency, established by U.S. Congress, to promote free flow of information around the world. The BBG oversees a number of international broadcasting organizations, such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. These organizations support U.S. foreign policy by providing audiences with comprehensive, accurate, and objective news and information, in languages, media, and program formats that are most appropriate. The aim is to present U.S. policies clearly and effectively, along with responsible discussion and opinion of those policies, thereby encouraging the development of free and independent media. Broadcasts are designed to represent American society and culture in a balanced and comprehensive way.⁴⁵

Radio broadcasts are only good if they can be heard and understood. There are some great success stories, such as the Voice of America (VOA) in Afghanistan. High poverty and extremely low literacy rates in Afghanistan create a poor news environment. There are no

newspapers, and not many TVs, making radio the key source of news. VOA broadcasts in Dari and Pashto, reaching 80 percent of Afghan males, with 72 percent indicating that they trust VOA and agree that VOA provides the facts and lets them make up their own minds.⁴⁶

In the Middle East, however, VOA has very little impact, with less than two percent of the population listening, based on weak broadcast signals. Norman Pattiz, Founder and Chairman of WESTWOOD ONE, and a member of the BBG, reviewed international broadcasting attempts in the Middle East even before September 11, and found them wanting. He developed a plan for the Middle East Radio Network, which would include 24-hour-per-day, seven day per week Arabic language coverage on multiple channels that audiences currently use. The plan includes programming separately targeted for Jordan, West Bank, Gaza, Iraq, Egypt, the Gulf and Sudan.

While international broadcasting offers great potential, these assets are rarely considered when planning strategic communications. The U.S. government foots the bill, yet international broadcasting does not want to appear to be “government owned.” The organization does not fit neatly into any interagency category. Limited budgets, and personnel who voluntarily serve on the board, make full-time and long range focus difficult. Consequently, international broadcasting can easily go unnoticed, in both the planning and funding stages of creating a communications strategy.

White House: Coalition Information Center: At the onset of the military ground campaign in Afghanistan, Karen Hughes, Senior Communications Advisor to the President, found it very difficult to respond to media reports generated from so far away. Together with Alistair Campbell, senior advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, they established a series of Coalition Information Centers (CIC), located in Washington, London, and Islamabad. Each CIC was designed as a short term, rapid response mechanism, to deliver accurate, timely

information every day. Working within the news cycle, the CIC focused on correcting inaccurate news claims, responding quickly to bad news, and maximizing the good news stories.

Staffed by representatives from several government agencies, the Washington CIC was organized by responsibilities: Theme Team; London; Pakistan; Media Consolidation; Media Monitoring; Investigations and Response; Terrorist Finances; DOD; and Department of State. To combat Taliban propaganda, the CIC produced a ‘Catalog of Lies,’ which listed the various allegations reported in the press, along with accurate explanations of circumstances surrounding each event.⁴⁷

The strength of the CIC is its access to the White House. An official working in the current administration notes, “For the short term, it brings together the key people, and serves as a good mechanism to get information out at the speed of news.”⁴⁸ The CIC has effectively responded to the close-in, daily battle for accurate information, but it is not equipped or staffed to address strategic communication issues over the long fight. Beyond reacting to the daily media, a communications strategy must include a proactive approach, preempting anti-American propaganda and promoting access to independent media and accurate information.

Other Agencies: Many government agencies, such as the Justice Department, and the Department of Treasury have a significant role in the war on terror. In fact, it is quite likely that these organizations’ efforts will far exceed the work of our military instrument. Yet, because of the sensitivity of the work, or the generally reserved nature of the organizations, their role is rarely communicated. A communications strategy for the war on terrorism would benefit from the insight of these organizations. While not necessarily addressing specific actions or methodology, communicating about these agencies supports our strategic goals. In a practical

sense, the coordination effort alone would help ensure other strategic messages do not jeopardize ongoing investigations.

National Security Council: The National Security Council (NSC) has attempted to coordinate the various interagency inputs into a single communications strategy. Greg Shulte, Senior Director for Southeast European Affairs for the NSC was involved in creating an information campaign to assist during the Kosovo air campaign and the overthrow of Milosevic, and he volunteered to help with a similar mission soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11. He initially found that the effort was not organized, had no consistent set of themes, and no delivery system. He established an ad hoc PCC: the Strategic Information Coordination Committee that met at least three times a week. Its mission was to build a Strategic Information Campaign that would be a longer-term effort to complement the CIC's focus on the day-to-day work.⁴⁹ Unfortunately, everyone assigned to the PCC had a number of other, full-time responsibilities, and little progress has been made in formalizing the committee.

The NSC is not currently well equipped to deal with the 24-hour news cycle, and lacks a permanent interagency structure to provide long term, full time, focus on strategic communications. The missing element, according to an official working in the current administration, is the ‘killer instinct’ – the interagency needs someone with the communication skill sets and access to principals.⁵⁰

Congress: Meanwhile, Congress has money to spend on the war on terrorism, and is frustrated with the lack of progress by any of the government agencies. Congressman Hyde (R-IL), chairman of the House International Relations Committee, has set his own course, holding hearings on the role of public diplomacy in winning the anti-terrorism war, and introducing legislation entitled, “The Freedom Promotion Act of 2002” to reform U.S. public diplomacy and

improve America's outreach to international mass audiences. The bill designates the State Department as the lead agency, and requires it to develop a comprehensive strategy and assume a prominent role in coordinating the efforts of all federal agencies involved in public diplomacy.⁵¹

Not to be outdone, Senator Joe Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is promoting a multilingual radio and TV project to reach the young adult Muslim audience, ages 15 to 30 years old. The project, called 'Initiative 911,' would be run by the BBG, and would broadcast in 26 languages, delivering news and information programs to audiences using local FM, AM, TV, Internet, and satellite services. The project is estimated to require 1000 personnel, and cost \$506 million the first year, with annual costs thereafter of \$222 million.⁵²

While both of these initiatives are likely very popular among constituents, they involve isolated instruments, and fall short of providing an overall strategic communications solution.

Private Sector: The private sector should not be overlooked when coordinating a communications strategy. During a House International Relations Committee hearing on "America is the Message: Rethinking U.S. Public Diplomacy," many private sector panel members demonstrated their expertise in communicating persuasively with foreign audiences, their understanding of the complex nature of the task, and their eagerness to support a long-term plan for the war on terrorism. Members of the panel included: WESTWOOD ONE's Norman Pattiz; John W. Leslie, Jr., Chairman, Weber Shandwick, the world's largest public relations firm, known for its work in shaping public attitudes on high-profile issues; Robert Wehling, 40 year veteran of marketing and advertising with Procter & Gamble, and former Chairman of the Board of the Advertising Council; Mouafac Harb, Washington, D.C. Bureau Chief for *Al Hayat*; and John Romano, TV writer/producer of more than a dozen series, including LA LAW and Hill

Street Blues.⁵³ Each member contributes a specific strength to the issue of strategic communications, and made many recommendations on how to proceed, such as focusing more on the next generation, and using all opportunities to advance our messages, including video games. Middle East Institute, in conjunction with the Ford Foundation, is establishing an exchange program for Egyptian and U.S. journalists. Romano suggested augmenting, free of charge, Middle East networks with existing television programming and older movies that are representative of U.S. culture and way of life.⁵⁴

While not under the control of the U.S. government, the private sector is rich in experience and access that should not be overlooked when planning a strategy for communicating with the world. To that end, the Atlantic Council of the United States is currently conducting a project to determine and promote roles for private sector that will improve the U.S. image in the Muslim world. The project will survey current activities and resources of U.S. companies and NGOs that may be useful, and will identify ways in which the role of the private sector could be enhanced.⁵⁵

Connecting WAYS to MEANS to get ENDS: All the Instruments in Harmony

Each agency or organization with a part of the strategic communications role – whether for domestic or foreign audiences – has worked tirelessly since September 11. Each has dedicated long hours to getting the message out, and through sheer effort, there has been a surge in communication opportunities. But the sum of the parts has been just that – parts. Many committees, task forces, working groups, and information centers have been established, coordinating their products with other agencies' efforts, but the overall effort has remained compartmentalized and extemporaneous.

Victoria Clarke insists the interagency process for disseminating information about the war on terrorism is strong, but ad hoc. “Form follows function. The actual process includes not just the military, but diplomatic and financial actions. To get the job done requires an interagency process, which is ongoing. Treasury, Justice, State, FBI are all very open to working together with DOD.”⁵⁶ While there is little agreement on who has the lead, there is unanimous agreement on the efforts that each agency has put into the ‘function’ of communicating strategically. But in order to continue to function, the orchestra needs some form.

Each instrument is important. Yet all instruments must work together, and take their lead from someone. But whom? Both State Department and Defense Department have different strategies, focusing on their specific missions, but the task of coordinating all aspects of this communications strategy requires direction by someone with a broader agenda. NSC does not have the resources or expertise to give this issue the attention it deserves. Other governmental agencies, the international broadcasting agencies, private sector organizations, and even the media should all be represented, but should not be in charge. CIC offers a good example of a short-term, or tactical approach to communications, and while it serves as a model for a more permanent entity, CIC has a separate mission, and should not be confused with the need for strategic communications oversight. Perhaps it is time to look beyond our current models.

Richard Holbrooke recommended the creation of a special office to get the message out, similar to the Office of War Information created during World War II. He emphasized that the organization needed to be directed by the White House, be given adequate resources and a sustained effort, and include talent from outside the government.⁵⁷ Holbrooke’s argument has merit.

Established in June 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) formulated and executed information programs designed to promote, at home and overseas, an understanding of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the U.S. government.⁵⁸ Developed from the consolidation of four other government agencies, the OWI was organized into Overseas Operations and Domestic Operations branches, with multiple bureaus focusing on radio, news, graphics, motion pictures, books and magazines, and foreign news. While perhaps not all aspects of the Office of War Information are applicable to today's information environment, the model is a sound one for structuring an interagency organization with both access to the President, and full-time focus on strategic, wartime communications.⁵⁹

The Commander-in-Chief must call the shots and sets the communication agenda for the war on terrorism. To be effective, the effort must be lead by someone who can best advise the President, and then coordinate the accomplishment of his orders. This director must be someone with access to President, who takes his 'Commander's intent' directly, not filtered through a number of other deputies.

To coordinate this effort, I recommend the re-creation of an Office of War Information, made up of representatives of all the government agencies involved in the war on terrorism, and members of private industries previously mentioned. The organization would be led by a Strategic Communication Advisor to the President, and funded and staffed at an appropriate level to provide full-time focus on a communications strategy for the war on terrorism.

There are already concerns about the Homeland Security Council competing with the NSC, and no doubt similar concerns will arise with this recommendation. Will an Office of War Information compete? Frankly, there is no time to wait and see. We must build it, provide the President with a Strategic Communication Advisor to head it up, and then let the NSC absorb it

later, if that is a more appropriate location for a long-term strategic communication mission. But for now, a separate organization, with direct access to the President, focused strictly on strategic communications for the war on terror, is the appropriate answer. Such an organization will not appear threatening to any of the agencies or organizations that currently claim a portion of the communications mission. An ‘Office of War Information’ is less likely to get distracted by other important strategic information needs, and has a good chance of interagency acceptance and support, increasing the overall probability of its success in communicating our nation’s intentions, policies, and actions, to the world.

Still, the solution will likely be messy. The structure of our democratic government allows for, encourages—even thrives on—many voices being heard. On Capitol Hill, 535 voices represent any manner of issues from districts or special interest groups. The State Department, the Defense Department, and the White House all have many voices. A strategic communication plan should not try to drown out the cacophony of ideas with one, louder voice. Rather, the Office of War Information should use a strategic communication plan to tune and harmonize the voices into one clear, melody that our audiences can recognize and understand.

The U. S. government needs a communications strategy that recognizes information as an instrument of national power, and uses it to advance our national strategy on the war on terrorism. Much worse than a simply widespread misunderstanding of American policies and intent, a lack of strategic communications can bring down the world’s superpower. Without an effective process for communicating our strategic purpose, we risk the loss of credibility and public support across the globe.

But strategic communications is hard work; it requires a thorough understanding of the cultural differences between the United States and those with whom we wish to communicate. It

is a complex task that addresses multiple audiences and reaches across many agencies, all with very important roles. A coordinated effort in the form of an Office of War Information will increase the effectiveness of the individual instruments, and create an orchestra, directed by a Strategic Communications Advisor, who takes his or her lead directly from the President.

A communications strategy for the war on terrorism is not about ‘spinning’ a message, or selling a product, or misleading an audience. What may have previously been considered a ‘nice touch,’ a strategy for getting the information piece right goes to the core of why we are in this war. It is our means to stem the flow of venom, and offer truth as an alternative to terrorism for the next generation.

¹ Peter Pace, addressing the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 3 April 2002.

² David Hoffman, “Beyond Public Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs Magazine* Vol 81, Issue 2, (Mar/Apr 2002): 83

³ “Improving the U.S. Public Diplomacy Campaign In the War Against Terrorism,” Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force on America’s Response to Terrorism, 6 November 2001, available from http://www.cfr.org/Members/publications/PubDiplom_TF.html accessed 5 February 2002.

⁴ Richard Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out,” *Washington Post*, 28 October 2001, B7.

⁵ William Douglas, “U.S. War Battled On Another Front: PR,” *Long Island Newsday*, 23 October 2001.

⁶ President George W. Bush, Press Conference, 11 October 2001.

⁷ Robert Killebrew, electronic interview by author, 26 January 2002.

⁸ Michael Howard, “What’s in a Name?: How to Fight Terrorism” *Foreign Affairs*; New York; 1 January 2002.

⁹ Robert Wright, “Rumsfeld’s Moment,” The New York Times, 20 January 2002 available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/opinion/20WRIG.html?pagewanted=print> accessed 23 January 2002.

¹⁰ “Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age,” Center for Strategic & International Studies Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age, available from <http://www.csis.org/pubs/diaexecsum.html> accessed 26 March 2002.

¹¹ “Senior government official,” interview by author, Washington, D.C., 15 February 2002.

¹² Donald Rumsfeld, DOD news release, 1 November 2001; available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/b11012001_bt560-01.html accessed 1 November 2001.

¹³ Philip Delves Broughton, “September Attacks ‘Staged by Pentagon’,” *London Daily Telegraph*, 2 April 2002.

¹⁴ Killebrew, electronic interview.

¹⁵ John McWethy, ABC News Pentagon reporter, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 23 January 2002.

¹⁶ John Hughes, “Pentagon and Press can both do their jobs” *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 November 2001, available from https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird.cgi?doc_url=/Nov2001/e20011114jobs.htm accessed 14 November 2001. “Pictures of body bags on television did not lead to public disaffection with Vietnam...the problem was the government’s deceitful accounting of the war, which led to what popularly became known as the credibility gap.” Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, “In Wartime, the People Want the Facts,” *The New York Times*, 29 January 2002, available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/29/opinion/29KOVA.html?pagewanted=print> accessed 29 January 2002.

¹⁷ Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, interview by author, 3 January 2002.

¹⁸ Ralph Peters, “The New Strategic Trinity,” *Parameters*, (Winter 1998): 73-79. “We are so informationally privileged that it is difficult to get a perspective on the richness that pervades our daily lives. The news in the papers, on radio, or on television will be amazingly accurate by international standards...we are informationally empowered to a degree that other states can only envy.”

¹⁹ Umit Enginsoy, Washington, D.C. Bureau Chief for Turkey’s National Television (NTV), interview by author, 15 February 2002.

²⁰ Craig Quigley, Rear Admiral, USN, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Central Command, interview by author, 8 February 2002.

²¹ Mouafac Harb, “America is the Message: Rethinking US Public Diplomacy,” testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 14 November 2001, transcript, p.22.

²² Tom Gjelten, NPR Pentagon correspondent, interview by author, 8 February 2002. Thomas L. Friedman, “Run, Osama, Run” *The New York Times*, 23 January 2002. According to Thomas Friedman, “There is enormous cultural resistance to believing anything good about America. Some of this is deliberately fanned by the state-run press in certain Arab countries to deflect criticism from the regime. Some is revenge for America’s support for Israel.

²³ Quigley, interview.

²⁴ Robert Wehling, “America is the Message: Rethinking US Public Diplomacy,” testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 14 November 2001, transcript, p. 19-20. Wehling also served as Chairman of the Board of the Advertising Council.

²⁵ Michio Hayashi, Washington, D.C. correspondent with *Yomiuri Shimbun*, interview by author, 15 February 2002. *Yomiuri Shimbun* is the largest Japanese daily newspaper.

²⁶ Harb, “America is the Message,” p. 23.

²⁷ Wehling, “America is the Message,” p. 21-22.

²⁸ Hayashi, interview.

²⁹ Pavel Vanichkin, correspondent with *Itar-Tass News Agency*, interview by author, 15 February 2002.

³⁰ Hayashi, interview.

³¹ Quigley, interview.

³² John Esposito, “America’s New Crisis: Understanding the Muslim’s World,” *Islam OnLine*, available from <http://www.islamonline.net/English/Views/2001/10article6.shtml> accessed 24 October 2001. Esposito pointed out that U.S. talk of self-determination, democracy, and human rights is often seen as hypocritical, especially in light of our policy of providing money and military equipment to Israel, the impact of ten years of sanctions on Iraq, and a passive neglect of India’s occupation of Kashmir, but no pressure on Israel and India regarding their nuclear developments.

³³ National Security Decision Directive Number 77, 14 January 1983; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1966t.gif> accessed 7 January 2002.

³⁴ National Security Decision Directive Number 130, 6 March 1984; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2213t.gif> accessed 8 January 2002.

³⁵ International Public Information (IPI) (PDD 68), 30 April 1999; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm> accessed 7 January 2002.

³⁶ Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination, 7.

³⁷ Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, 13.

³⁸ Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, 3.

³⁹ Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, 5,7.

⁴⁰ Bruce Gregory, State Department, interview by author, 14 December 2001.

⁴¹ Neal Walsh, State Department, interview by author, 20 December 2001.

⁴² Bill Parker, Director, International Information Programs, and Education and Cultural Affairs, State Department, interview by author, 18 December 2001.

⁴³ Foreign Press Center mission statement and goals, available at www.fpc.gov

⁴⁴ Rick Machamer, Colonel, U.S. Army, DOD Liaison to Washington Foreign Press Center, interview by author, 15 February 2002.

⁴⁵ Broadcast Board of Governors, Annual Report, 2000, p. 2.

⁴⁶ David Burke, “A Truthful Voice,” *Washington Post*, 10 October 2001.

⁴⁷ Eric Holland, DOD representative at CIC, interview by author, 18 January 2002.

⁴⁸ “Official working in current administration,” interview by author, 9 January 2002.

⁴⁹ Greg Shulte, Senior Dir for SE European Affairs, NSC, interview by author, 2 February, 2002.

⁵⁰ “Official working in current administration,” interview.

⁵¹ Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of House International Relations Committee, “Freedom Promotion Act of 2002,” 20 March 2002.

⁵² *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 December 2001.

⁵³ “America is the Message: Rethinking US Public Diplomacy,” testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 14 November 2001.

⁵⁴ “America is the Message: Rethinking US Public Diplomacy,” testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 14 November 2001.

⁵⁵ Richard Nelson, Atlantic Council of the United States, email to author, 4 January 2002. The intended outcome will be recommendations on how to form a better partnership between the U.S. government and the private sector in promoting messages that will help shape a more favorable environment for the struggle against terrorism.

⁵⁶ Clarke, interview.

⁵⁷ Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out.”.

⁵⁸ Elmer Davis, *War Information and Censorship* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, October, 1943.) According to Executive Order 9182, OWI was established “in recognition of the right of the American people and of all other peoples opposing the Axis aggressors to be truthfully informed.”

⁵⁹ Elmer Davis, “Public Information In a War Economy,” Publication No. L48-142, (address given at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., 16 May 1948), Elmer Davis served as Director of Office of War Information. He indicated that he had recommended to the President that “an office of war information, if needed in any future emergency, should be operated by the White House Press Secretary...for two reasons: these functions are part of the President’s responsibilities...and an information service will work only if it is very closely tied in with the top information, which are the statements and decisions made by the President himself.”